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WHEN SELF-GOVERNANCE IS A GAME*
Steven L. Winter;
No. 6: "It looks like a unanimous majority...."
No. 2: "Exactly. That's whats worrying me. Very bad for morale.
Some of these good people don't seem to appreciate the value of free
elections. They think it's a game ..
I. SORE LOSERMAN
I expect that everyone has an iconic memory, image, or
picture from the extraordinary five-week period following the
2000 presidential election. The image that stands out for me is
that of the "Sore-Loserman" placard which started popping up
above crowds of Republican demonstrators in Florida toward
the end of the second week of the post-election contest.2 I like a
good pun, and the sign struck me as clever. Not only did it
mimic in color and script the design of the Gore-Lieberman
banners of the campaign, but the pun made vivid what had
previously been only implicit in the rhetoric of Bush campaign
officials.3 These signs-and, later, T-shirts-showed up with
increasing frequency over the next two weeks. One often heard
much the same sentiment in the everyday debates that
characterized the period. One email from a colleague
* ©2002 Steven L. Winter. All Rights Reserved.
t Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. This work was supported by a
summer research grant from the Brooklyn Law School.
1 "Free for All," The Prisoner (Episode Four, originally aired October 29,
1967)
2 See David Barstow, Voting Battle Threatens Florida's Uneasy Truce Between
Political Parties, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 20, 2000, at A15.
3 Frank Bruni & Jim Yardley, Bush Aides, Casting Gore Camp as Sore Losers,
Plot Next Steps, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2000, at A28 ("Mr. Bush's advisers.. . came to a
news conference here armed with voter registration statistics, visual aids and pointed
implications that Vice President Al Gore and his allies were acting like sore losers.").
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analogized the Democrats' post-election challenge to the Mets
trying to reopen the World Series because of a bad call by an
umpire or on the ground that the lights were too dim at one of
the night games.
The analogy struck me as terribly inapt. Surely, I
replied, there is a difference between a sports contest-even
one so important as the World Series-and the solemn exercise
of the franchise in a presidential election. True, the World
Series is not without consequence: The emotional stakes for the
fans are high and the financial stakes for the players and their
teams are both real and substantial. But it is still a game,
and-while its rewards ought to be dispensed fairly according
to the rules-there is no substantive moral, ethical, or political
value to the rules in-and-of themselves. With or without the
ground-rule double, the designated hitter, or the infield fly
rule,4 baseball would still be a fair contest. Without the ground
rules provided by the First Amendment, in contrast, no election
could be deemed fair. Elections, it should have gone without
saying, are different because they do have a moral point: They
are about democracy and self-rule.5 We hold elections to
register the will of the governed (as best we can) in choosing
(as best we can) how we shall be governed and by whom. The
content of the rules matter-that is, they have an ethical
dimension-precisely because they may conduce to results that
reflect either more or less well the will of the people and,
therefore, render the resulting government more or less
legitimate.
We can highlight the difference between games and
elections by considering some salient differences in their rules.
Both games and elections have rules that regulate who is
eligible to participate and how errors are to be ascertained and
corrected. But we would neither expect nor tolerate the same
sort of rules in both contexts. Because competitive games are
4 See Aside, The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1474 (1975).
5 When the manual recount in one Florida county found 320 ballots that
hadn't been processed by the machines at all, yielding a net gain for Bush of fifty-two
votes, one Democrat observed: "This is a good example of why you ought to have a hand
count.... This is not a game of up and down at any moment. This is a matter of a very,
very important franchise." Somini Sengupta, Volusia County Workers Race the Clock to
Hand-Count Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2000, at A9.
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played to win, we characteristically expect-and always
tolerate-meritocratic selection procedures. Professional sports
teams pay top dollar to get the most able players; if there is a
draft, they are expected to select the best available players in
the pool. Even in choosing up sides on the playground, it is
common (though certainly not mandatory) for the respective
captains to choose players on the basis of ability rather than
friendship. Meritocratic participation rules for elections, in
contrast, are today considered objectionable. Once common
restrictions on the franchise such as poll taxes, literacy tests,
and property requirements have been repudiated on largely
egalitarian grounds.6 So, too, meritocratic qualifications for
candidates-that is, qualifications other than the standard
citizenship, age, and residency requirements-would be invalid
under the Equal Protection Clause or First Amendment.7
Conversely, we tolerate much more arbitrary and unreliable
error-correction mechanisms in games than in elections. In
baseball, for example, the umpire's call will stand even when
the instant replay has conclusively shown it to be wrong. But,
every state provides for some form of recount in a close
election; thirty-five states require the courts to give effect to
the intent of the voter if it is at all discernable from the ballot.8
One would have thought all this perfectly obvious but
for the course of the 2000 presidential contest and the muted
reaction to its resolution. The rhetoric of the period reveals
that, for many Americans, it was the game metaphor-and not
the substantive values of democracy and self-governance-that
structured how they perceived, understood, and evaluated the
election process. The game metaphor, in other words, did not
" See Kramer v. Union Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). As Dean
Kronman explains, classical republicanism, assumed that
a person's capacity for self-rule depends on fixed attributes like sex
and intelligence in such an obvious, regular, and important way that
these may themselves be used as criteria for determining who shall be
allowed to participate in the political life of their community. Like
nearly everyone else today, the new republicans reject this assumption
and the inegalitarian implications that flow from it.
ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEAlS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
37 (1993).
7 See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) (equal protection); Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 41 (1968) (H-rlan,
J., concurring) (First Amendment).
" Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 124 n.2 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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just characterize how they talked about the post-election
process, it animated their normative judgments. And, as we
shall see, this was true not just for ordinary Americans, but
also for respected political commentators, distinguished legal
scholars, and several members of the Supreme Court majority
in Bush v. Gore.9
To be clear, I am not making a monistic causal claim,
but an ontological one-i.e., that the game metaphor shaped,
structured, and animated how many Americans understood
and evaluated the post-election- process." My purpose is not so
much to explain the outcome of the post-election contest as it is
to expose some fundamental and disturbing fault lines that run
through the very heart of contemporary American democracy.
There were, of course, many reasons for the failure of
the Democrats' competing rhetoric insisting on a "full, fair and
accurate count." For one thing, the Gore campaign was
unconscionably late in coming to it-focusing in the early days
on the butterfly ballot in Palm Beach County and the
unwitting Buchanan votes that it produced.1 Gore, moreover,
waited much too long before personally making the case for a
full and fair count to the American people. Most devastating of
all was the fact that the Democrats' insistence that every vote
count was belied by their decision to seek recounts only in
counties with Democratic majorities. 2 So, too, there were other
9 Id. at 111 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
10 Here, we see the problem with the conventional academic practice of
distinction drawing: Obviously, the claim that the game metaphor predisposed the
relevant actors toward a particular outcome (the ontological claim) is a claim that the
game metaphor was a contributing cause of the outcome of the post-election contest.
Thus, the distinction between an ontological claim and a causal one is not an all-or-
nothing distinction on the model of P and not-P, but merely a matter of degree.
" The 2000 Election: Statements by Daley and Christopher on Their Findings
on the Florida Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, at A29. In fact, a subsequent study of
the Florida ballots commissioned by a consortium of news media found that the
butterfly ballot did cost Gore the election. Five thousand, three hundred and ten Palm
Beach County voters voted for both Gore and Buchanan and 2600 voted for Bush and a
second presidential candidate, which would have yielded a net gain for Gore of 2710
votes-far in excess of the 537 vote margin by which Bush carried Florida. Ford
Fassenden & John M. Broder, Study of Disputed Florida Ballots Finds Justices Did
Not Cast Deciding Vote, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 12, 2001, at Al, A16.
" On November 14th, a New York Times/CBS News poll found that "50
percent of the respondents said they thought the Gore campaign was challenging the
result in Florida because they disliked the outcome; only 37 percent thought it was
doing so because it thought the election may have been conducted unfairly in some
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reasons for the quiescence of the American public and its
acquiescence in the Supreme Court's resolution of the contest.
For one thing, the Gore team had no endgame: A prolonged
contest would most probably have thrown the election to the
Republican-controlled House where Bush would almost
certainly have won. In addition, the relentlessly centrist
campaigns run by both candidates no doubt left many
Americans with the dispiriting-though (sadly) mistaken-
impression that it didn't matter who was selected given that
there seemed little difference between the candidates on most
issues.
But, however feckless the Democrats and however
uninspiring the campaign, the electorate still had every reason
to insist that the presidency is not the World Series and that
the post-election contest ought to be resolved in a way that
accords with core democratic values. After all, we hold elections
to ascertain the will of the voters not the sportsmanship of the
candidates or the preferences of our Supreme Court Justices."3
So, the question remains: Why, despite what would
seem to be its obvious normative inappropriateness, was the
game metaphor so powerful? I take up this question in the
sections that follow. I first examine the rhetoric of the post-
jurisdictions in the state." R.W. Apple, Motivation: Behind a 'Noble Toga" Find Naked
Ambitions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,2000, at A23.
Ironically, a subsequent study of the Florida ballots commissioned by a
consortium of news media found that a recount of the four majority-Democratic
counties would not have altered the outcome of the election, but that a statewide
recount would have regardless of what standard was used to evaluate the ballots.
Fassenden & Broder, supra note 11, at A16.
13 In a similar vein, consider the post hoc rationalization--commonly heard
since the September 11th attacks-captured by the following exchange:
Rob Schneider: I hate to tell you the truth. The truth is the military is
much happier having...
Carol Whitney: Oh, absolutely!
Schneider: ... President Bush.
Whitney: ... and Rumsfeld.
Schneider: Believe me! Believe me! ...
Bill Maher: Okay. Yeah.
Jeffery Toobin: The military are patriotic Americans who support their
country, I think regardless of who the political leadership is.
Whitney: But, they prefer...
Toobin: Well that's right, "they prefer." But, you know what? It's not
up to the military. It's up to the voters. And the voters decide who the
President is.
Politically Incorrect (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 29, 2001).
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election period. I show how the game metaphor works and
explore its operation in the rhetoric and decisions of the post-
election contest. I then take up the question of why the game
metaphor should be so compelling in this context. This
discussion will yield some rather distressing conclusions about
the state of our contemporary "democratic" society and a
radical recommendation about what we might do about it.
II. THE GAME IS AFOOT
The game metaphor emerged in public discourse the
morning after the election. Commenting on the discrepancy
between the popular vote and the projected winner of the
Electoral College, a Republican supporter admonished: "If you
don't want to follow the rules, don't play the game."" In a letter
to the Editor of the New York Times written the following day,
another Republican supporter argued that: "Both candidates
knew the rules ahead of time.... They both knew they needed
electoral votes; that's how they played the game. You can't
change the rules during the game."" That same day, the Times
reported that the Gore team hoped that the Vice President's
return to Washington from his campaign headquarters in
Nashville would allow him "to maintain some distance from the
escalating political battle and any public perception that he is
14 Jodi Wilgoren, Dead Center: Eternal Spotlight Yields to Infernal Wait, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, at B4.
15 James W. Sampair, Jr., In Palm Beach County, Crucible of an Election, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2000, at A32. Judge Posner makes the same point in his recent book on
the election.
Shortly before the election it was believed that Bush might gain a
popular vote majority and that Gore a majority of the electoral votes.
If that was Bush's perception, he must have redoubled his efforts to
win electoral votes, and the popular vote be damned. To call the
winner of the popular vote for President the "real" winner, to accord
constitutional status to the winner of the popular vote, and to question
the legitimacy of the candidate who won the electoral vote and so
became President are further examples of changing the rules of the
game after the game has been played.
RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCm THE 2000 ELECTION, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 225 (2000).
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not prepared to abide by the rules of the game."5 The following
Sunday, the Times summed up the national mood this way:
Americans do not like ties. Virtually none of the sports that
dominate national life allow them. If it takes overtime, a penalty
kick, a sudden death playoff or extra innings, everyone expects a
winner and everyone knows that the Mets and the Yankees cannot
both be World Series champs.
So it is perhaps no surprise that the political system seems
challenged by an election that is as close as it ever comes to a tie,
and whose outcome may take time to determine and never be
resolved with scientific certainty.
17
Clearly, the game metaphor was in play (pun intended) even
before the subject of hand recounts, hanging chads, and how
best to discern the intent of the voters had come to dominate
the public discourse.
The Republicans filed suit November 11th, seeking to
enjoin manual recounts. The suit, filed just as hand counts
were beginning in Palm Beach County, alleged (among other
things) that the standards for ascertaining the intent of the
voters would be applied differently in different counties in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 8 Initially, the Palm
Beach County board of elections counted only those ballots
containing chads with at least two detached corners."9 After
rulings in several of the Democrats' state court challenges, the
Palm Beach and Broward boards decided to count as well
chads that were merely indented and not perforated (so-called
dimpled or pregnant chads).2" It was at this point that the
is Katharine Q. Seelye, The Vice President: Gore Withdraws From the Field as
Aides Prepare for Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2000, at A29. The article also reports
Gore aides as observing that the fact that their candidate had won the popular vote
allowed him to "demand an accurate count without appearing to be, in the words of one
adviser, 'a cranky spoilsport.' "Id.
17 Todd S. Purdum, The System: National Psyche Hates a Game No One Wins,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2000, §1, p 1.
'a David Firestone & Michael Cooper, Bush Sues to Halt Hand Recount in
Florida. Palm Beach Tally Starts as G.O.P. Cites Risk of Flaws in Process, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 2000, at Al.
19 Rick Bragg, Palm Beach County: At Long Last, Army of Volunteers Gets Its
Orders to Begin Recount, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2000, at A29.
20 Kevin Sack, Palm Beach County; Key Recount Waits Again For Approval
From Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2000, at A31; Dana Canedy & David Gonzalez,
Broward County: Judge Leaves Chads, Dimpled or Otherwise, to Discretion of Recount
Team, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2000, at A15; Don Van Natta, Jr., Recounts Drag On:
Court Battle Lines Are Drawn, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2000, at Al.
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game metaphor became the linchpin of the Republicans'
rhetorical strategy. For the next several days, Republicans
repeatedly accused the Democrats of changing the rules in the
middle of the game in order to manufacture additional votes for
Gore. 1
Not surprisingly, the truth was more complicated. The
decision of the Broward board was by unanimous vote of its
two Democratic and one Republican members.' The change in
the Palm Beach policy was pursuant to court order."
Nevertheless, the charge stuck. When the Florida Supreme
Court extended the deadline for hand recounts, the sense of a
partisan breach of the ground rules was exacerbated.
Republican spokesman James Baker declared: "It is simply not
fair, ladies and gentlemen, to change the rules, either in the
middle of the game or after the game has been played."' The
Indianapolis Star complained: "In poker, if a player declares
deuces wild after the cards are dealt and bets are placed, it's no
longer a fair game. It's a rip-off."'
This sentiment was so strongly and widely held that, at
oral argument before the Supreme Court, Laurence Tribe chose
to address it first:
21 Canedy & Gonzalez, supra note 20, at A15; Van Natta, supra note 20, at Al;
Robin Toner, The Conservatives: From the Anti-Gore Right, A Battle Cry of 'Stop,
Thiefi', N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2000, A37 ("The conservative message these days is
simple and laced with the anger of eight long years out of the White House: the
Democrats are trying to steal this election, they say. They're trying to hold on, to
change the rules of the game, to thwart the will of the people.").
2 Van Natta, supra note 20, at Al ("The board, made up of two Democrats and
a Republican, voted unanimously to consider dimpled or one-corner chads, the tiny
pieces of paper that are normally dislodged from punch cards when a voter makes a
choice.... Previously, the board had counted only chads with two or more corners
punched through as votes.").
23 Sack, supra note 20, at A31. See also Ford Fessenden & Christopher Drew,
The Voting Cards: Chads Have Their Place in Annals of the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2000, at A32 (reporting similar rulings by courts in Alaska, Illinois, Massachusetts,
and South Dakota).
24 Baker's Response to Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2000, at A24. See also
Frank Bruni, The Reaction: Bush Camp, Outraged, Vows to Seek Recourse to Ruling,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2000, at Al.
Felicity Barringer, The Reaction: Editorials Blend Bitterness and Calls for
Common Sense, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2000, at A42.
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I think I would want to note at the outset that the alleged due-
process violation, which keeps popping up and then
disappearing, . . . is really not before the Court, and for
understandable reasons, because although it is part of the popular
culture to talk about how unfair it is to change the rules of the game,
I think that misses the point when the game is over.., in a kind of
photo-finish.... A manual recount, sometimes taking more time,...
would be rather like looking more closely at the film of a photo
finish.
Ws nothing extraordinary. It's not like suddenly moving
Heartbreak Hill or adding a mile or subtracting a mile from a
marathon.26
This argument is revealing for at least three reasons. First, it
acknowledges how much the game metaphor dominated public
opinion. So much so, in fact, that though Tribe dismisses the
legal relevance of the sentiment he nevertheless feels
constrained to respond to it. Second, though Tribe shrewdly
tries to turn the metaphor to his advantage, he does so only at
the expense of confirming it-a form of what, in the book I
refer to as "antinomal capture."27 For, in using the "photo
finish" and "marathon" tropes, Tribe is invoking the metaphor
in its purest, most conventional, most prototypical form: It is,
after all, a presidential race in which competing candidates run
for office. Tribe extends the conventional metaphor by
modeling other aspects from the source domain of races to
elaborate conceptions not part of the metaphor's standard stock
of entailments: This race, he says, is the exceptional case; it is
like a photo finish; if the race is too close to call, then some
special mechanism-obviously requiring additional time-will
be needed to decide it.
Third, and this follows closely from the previous point,
Tribe's argument underscores how deeply entrenched the game
metaphor really is. Not only does Tribe employ it in its most
prototypical form, but he pays a particularly steep price for
doing so. For, though Tribe is conscious and careful about how
he extends the metaphor, he cannot control its implications
once invoked. Once invoked, the metaphor inevitably and
26 Contesting the Vote: A Transcript of Arguments in the Supreme Court over
the Florida Recount, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2000, at A12.
27 STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 11
(2001) ("[Mlore often than not, the price of opposition is that one is defined precisely by
what one most vehemently rejects.").
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unconsciously prompts all of its more prototypical entailments.
Both the image of a photo finish and the trope of adding (or
subtracting) a mile from the course of a marathon imply a race
with a definite and determinate end. And that, precisely, is
what the recount and ensuing litigation was obviously not
providing. From all outward appearances-the lawyers, the
spokespersons and spin doctors, the handlers and political ops,
the press coverage and public attention-the race was still very
much on.28
We are now in a position to make our first pass at the
question raised at the outset: Why did the game rhetoric seem
to have greater resonance than arguments premised directly on
substantive democratic values? One reason is that the game
metaphor is constitutive of our very concept of elections. This is
manifest in the conventional linguistic construction of an
election as a race in which the candidates run for office. By the
same token, we speak of dark horse and stalking horse
candidates. And a political race is constantly handicapped by
public opinion polls so we can determine at any moment who is
ahead. The game metaphor can also be seen in such
iconographic representations as the 1876 political cartoon by
Thomas Nast entitled "A National Game that Is Played Out."
(Figure 1.) We can test this conclusion further by considering
the overall shape of the game metaphor and then seeing how
its entailments are reflected in American political culture,
generally, and in the post-election discourse, in particular.
The classic, still influential study of play is Johan
Huizinga's Homo Ludens.29 Huizinga describes play-more
specifically, agonistic games (i.e., games involving a contest
against an opponent)-as characterized by five, overlapping
elements. First, play is voluntary; as Roger Caillois observes,
compelled play loses its spontaneous devotion and becomes
'8 Indeed, while the case wound its way through the Florida courts, David
Boies said: "You don't call the end of the game after the first inning or the second
inning"-leading the Times to conclude "that the 2000 campaign is now in a litigation
phase that may not end soon." William Glabers, On the Law: A Method to the Logic of
the Court Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2000, at A13.
JOHAN HUIZINGA, HOMO LUDENS: A STUDY OF THE PLAY ELEMENT IN
CULTURE (1950) (original Swiss publication in 1944). Huizinga's study, with its em-
phasis on agonistic forms of play, has been criticized as parochially Western and
masculine. See BRIAN SUTTON-SMITH, THE AMBIGUITY OF PLAY 79-80 (1997). See also
discussion infra text accompanying nn. 89-91.
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Figure 1: Thomas Nast, A National Game that is Played Out
(1876).
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drudgery." "Only when play is a recognized cultural function,"
Huizinga adds, "is it bound up with notions of obligation and
duty."1
Second, play defines its own, specialized domain: "It is
rather a stepping out of 'real' life into a temporary sphere with
a disposition all its own. . . . It interpolates itself as a
temporary activity satisfying in itself and ending there.32
Third, and relatedly, play is distinct in location and duration:
"It is 'played out' within certain limits of time and place. It
contains its own course and meaning."" Play thus constituted
immediately assumes a fixed, repeatable form-it becomes a
game-typically with an internal structure that is itself
characterized by "repetition and alternation."' This formal
quality of games, Arthur Leff explains, also has substantive
implications: "The players in any game are treated for
purposes of the game as formally identical. They have each the
same access to the field and the mechanisms of play, and the
same formal entitlements (if not simultaneously, then at least
in equal succession)."35
Fourth, the special temporal and spatial domain of the
game is characterized by "an absolute and peculiar order."6 In
Huizinga's words, play "creates order, is order. Into an
imperfect world and into the confusion of life it brings a
temporary, a limited perfection. The least deviation from it
'spoils the game'. . . .37 The virtual identity between a game
and the formal order of its rules is what accounts for two of the
most distinctive, otherwise paradoxical qualities of games: that
the rules of the game are essentially arbitrary and, at the same
time, utterly authoritative.38 Within the fixed space or given
time of the game, the confusion and chaos of the real world is
replaced "by precise, arbitrary, unexceptionable rules that
oROGER CAILLOIS, MAN, PLAY, AND GAMES 6 (Meyer Barash trans., 1961).
HUIZINGA, supra note 29, at 8.
"Id. at 8-9.
"Id. at9.
34 Id. at 9-10.
3" Arthur A. Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989, 999-1000 (1978).
36 HUIZINGA, supra note 29, at 10.
37 id.
38 "All play has its rules. They determine what 'holds' in the temporary world
circumscribed by play. The rules of a game are absolutely binding and allow no doubt."
Id. at 11.
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must be accepted as such." 9 The spoilsport who withdraws
from the game or denounces the rules as absurd is, therefore,
worse than the cheat. The cheat may violate the rules, but at
least pretends publicly to respect them. The spoilsport, in
contrast, "shatters the play-world" by revealing its "relativity
and fragility."40 Caillois elaborates: "The game is ruined by the
nihilist" because "his arguments are irrefutable. The game has
no other but an intrinsic meaning. That is why its rules are
imperative and absolute, beyond discussion. There is no reason
for their being as they are, rather than otherwise."'
Fifth, and finally, play has a necessary element of
tension or doubt. Huizinga explains:
Tension means uncertainty, chanciness; a striving to decide the
issue and so end it. The player wants something to "go", to "come
off*; he wants to "succeed" by his own exertions.... It is this element
of tension and solution that governs all solitary games of skill and
application such as puzzles.... Though play as such is outside the
range of good and bad, the element of tension imparts to it a certain
ethical value in so far as it means a testing of the player's prowess:
his courage, tenacity, resources....42
For this tension to persist, Caillois says: "Doubt must
remain until the end, and hinges upon the denouement."" Leff
explains: "The most significant thing about games, therefore, is
that they have a resolution.... A game is an activity in terms
of which you can know with some precision what you did and
how you came out."
Surely you recognize in this description all the major
features of American elections, in general, and of last year's
post-election political rhetoric, in particular.41 In our country,
voting is certainly bound up with notions of civic duty. But,
unlike many Western European democracies, we staunchly
resist the idea that voting should be made compulsory. Unlike
'1 CAILLOIS, supra note 30, at 7 (emphasis added).
HUIZINGA, supra note 29, at 10.
41 CAILLOIS, supra note 30, at 7.
42 HUIZINGA, supra note 29, at 10-11.
43 CAILLOIS, supra note 30, at 7.
"Leff, supra note 35, at 1000.
45 Lest you think that I have made any of this up or that the definition is in
any way tailored to the election context, let me remind you that Huizinga, who was
German-Swiss, wrote in 1944; that Caillois, who was French, wrote in 1960; and that
Leff was writing about adjudication.
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parliamentary systems, our elections are at repeated, fixed
intervals. We expect election decisions to be made on a
particular day and in an all-or-nothing fashion: For us, there is
no waiting period during which the winning party puts
together a coalition to form a government. American elections
are winner-take-all affairs, no matter how close the vote; few,
indeed, are the electoral schemes that smack of any form of
proportional representation.46 And presidential races, at least,
are about prowess and tenacity: It is a staple of American
politics that a presidential candidate must have the proverbial
"fire in the belly."
More interesting for our purposes are the decisions,
arguments, and exhortation of the post-election period in which
the impress of this conventional conception of games is clearly
reflected. Some cases, such as the "Sore-Loserman" reference
and the "can't change the rules in the middle of the game"
refrain, are sufficiently obvious that they do not require
discussion (though I shall have more to say on the latter in a
moment). Others, though more marginal to the public
discourse, are nonetheless striking. One such example is
Thomas Friedman's Op-Ed column the morning of the final
Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore.47 Echoing Caillois's
observation that "doubt must remain until the end," Freedman
argued that the "fairest way to handle this too-close-to-call vote
in Florida would have been the one solution by which, if you
adopted it, you would not know who would win."8 He
encouraged the Supreme Court to adopt "a solution-a
statewide hand recount by a uniform standard-that would
leave both Mr. Gore and Mr. Bush with a sick feeling that once
the recount has started they don't know who will win." 9 Only
when the Court "has re-established that sick feeling in both
men" will it "have ensured a legitimate outcome and restored
4 The principal exceptions are the two states (Maine and Nebraska) that, by
statute, proportion their Electoral College votes. See Robert W. Bennett, Popular
Election of the President Without a Constitutional Amendment, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 241,
241 (2001).
47 Thomas L. Friedman, Foreign Affairs: A Tally of Two Countries, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 2000, at A33.
48 Id.
49id.
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the authority of this election to where it belongs-with 'We the
people."'
5
Friedman's argument is arresting in its insistence that
the adequacy of a remedy is to be measured by the sick feeling
it engenders in the candidates. At first blush, he seems quite
sensibly to be saying that a remedy which leaves the
candidates in doubt is most likely to be a fair one.51 If neither
side can predict a win, then one can reasonably infer that the
chosen remedy advantages neither candidate. But Friedman is
also saying something more and different. Earlier in the piece,
he discusses the substantive adequacy of the standard that
should be employed on any recount: "'Any dimple will do' is no
way to recount votes, and no recount of votes in an impossibly
close election is no way to win." His proposal is "the sunshine
rule-that only punch ballots that are perforated so that you
can see light through them can be counted."" But, at the close
of the piece, he does not equate the democratic legitimacy of
the election with the fair and meticulous counting procedures
that he has just proposed. Rather, it is the restoration of
tension and doubt-"when the court has re-established that
sick feeling in both men" 53-that ensures a democratic and
legitimate outcome. This is not a proposal to check more
carefully the outcome of a race already completed as in a photo
finish, but rather a bid to reinstate the tension and doubt of
the competition itself. And, not coincidentally, it is a proposal
s Id.5 Friedman's argument points out the bivalent nature of the game metaphor,
which has good entailments as well as bad. Because the focus of my argument has been
on the ways in which the game metaphor skewed the debate during the post-election
contest-supplanting the fundamental democratic values that should have informed
the outcome-some might conclude that the game metaphor (or metaphor, generally) is
inherently distorting. But that conclusion follows only upon discredited objectivist
assumptions about language as reference to a mind-independent reality that the
metaphor could, then, "misrepresept." Once we understand metaphor as constitutive of
our reality, the only relevant qugstion is the pragmatic one whether the particular
metaphor enables useful or harmful perceptions, insights, and actions. WINTER, supra
note 27, at 65-67. Friedman's argument-that a recount procedure that would
engender a "sick feeling" in the candidates would be a fair one-illustrates the positive
value of the game metaphor in structuring notions of "fair play." See CAILLOIS, supra
note 30, at 47 ("There is no better example of the civilizing role of play than the
inhibitions it usually places on natural avidity."); HUIZINGA, supra note 29, at 207
("There can be no doubt that it is just this play-element that keeps parliamentary life
healthy.... ").
Friedman, supra note 47.
53 Id.
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that would further test the mettle of the candidates-that is,
their courage, tenacity, sportsmanship, etc.
More interesting still are two sets of legal arguments
that, upon examination, depend upon the entailments of the
game metaphor. The per curium opinion in Bush v. Gore held
that, because the Florida Supreme Court had indicated "that
the Florida Legislature intended to obtain the safe-harbor
benefits of 3 U.S.C. § 5," no remand to the Florida Supreme
Court for a further remedy was possible.' Chief Justice
Rehnquist's concurring opinion went further, arguing that
Article II constrained state judicial interpretation of state
legislative action with respect to presidential elections.55
According to the concurring opinion, the contest period
provided by state statute "necessarily terminates on the date
set by 3 U.S.C. § 5 for concluding the State's 'final
determination' of election controversies."56 Entirely absent from
the opinion is any explanation of why the safe harbor provision
provides a necessary terminus for the recount. Instead, we are
offered the assertion that: "Surely when the Florida
Legislature empowered the courts of the State to grant
'appropriate' relief, it must have meant relief that would have
become final by the cut-off date of 3 U.S.C. § 5."57 Exactly why
"it must have meant" a final cut-off of December 12th is
unclear. Neither the state legislature nor the Florida Supreme
Court in its prior interpretation of the statute provided any
indication of how one should handle the trade-off between
finality (as ensured by the safe harbor provision) and accuracy
(as proposed by the statewide recount).
It is easy enough to explain this lapse cynically as
nothing more than a result-oriented argument by the Court's
three most conservative members. Personally, I am
sympathetic to that explanation though, for reasons I will
explain in a moment, I cannot accept it as complete.
Alternatively, one could argue, as Judge Posner does, that the
Court was right to let considerations of finality dictate the
result so as to avoid the uncertainties of possibly throwing the
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111.
Id. at 112-16 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Id. at 117.
67 Id. at 121 (emphasis added).
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election to the House." (I am, as you might imagine, less
sympathetic to this one.) In any event, there is nothing
surprising in the Court raising concerns about finality five
weeks after election day.
But, whether one is cynical or approving, there are two
problems with these result-oriented explanations. The first is
that the rhetoric of finality had been a staple of Republican
rhetoric from day one. The morning after the election Bush
insisted that "the final vote count there shows that Secretary
Cheney and I have carried the State of Florida." 9 The next day,
his campaign chairman, Donald Evans, said that: "Our
democratic process calls for a vote on Election Day. It does not
call for us to continue voting until someone likes the
outcome."60 That Saturday, after the initial recount had been
completed and the Republicans had filed suit to enjoin the
manual recount, James Baker urged "the Gore campaign to
accept the finality of the election" even though, as he noted, the
absentee votes had yet to be counted.6 Both Baker and others
made frequent references to Presidents Nixon and Ford who
chose to concede close elections in 1960 and 1976, respectively,
rather than polarize the country by prolonging the contest.62
The second problem is the one I raise in the book under
the rubric of "law as persuasion.S As the plurality in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey" so painfully recognized, judicial decisions
must at the least be "sufficiently plausible to be accepted by
the Nation"5 on the terms claimed for them, as grounded in
law, and "not as compromises with social and political
pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices
POSNER, supra note 15, at 143-60.
"9 The 2000 Election: Bush's View of the Election, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, at
B3.
60 'We Are Confident": Statements by Officials of the Bush Campaign, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2000, at A28.
6' Counting the Vote: Baker Calls for "No Further Recounts," N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
12, 2000, A24; see also The 2000 Election: Statements by Daley and Christopher on
Their Findings on the Florida Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2000, at A29 (reprinting
statement by Daley accusing the Republicans of "put[ting] a demand for finality ahead
of the pursuit of fairness").
62 See, e.g., Firestone & Cooper, supra note 18; Walter A. McDougall, The
Slippery Statistics of the Popular Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2000, at A35 (Op-Ed).
6W-TER, supra note 27, at 152-56, 309-31.
6505 U.S. 833 (1992).
"Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865-66
(1992) (Opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.).
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that the Court is obliged to make. 6 Even if we were to accept
the cynical account, there would remain the questions of how
the Justices came to make the characterizations they did and
why others might find those interpretations plausible. In other
words, as I argue in the book, the need to make judicial
decisions credible operates as a constraint on what those
positions can reasonably be. And this constraint is operative
regardless of the judge's result-orientation or political
motivation.
Here, both problems point inexorably to the finality
entailment of the game metaphor. A game, Huizinga
admonishes us, "proceeds within its own proper boundaries of
time and space according to fixed rules and in an orderly
manner."7 Indeed, as Leff says: "The most significant thing
about games, therefore, is that they have a resolution."
Finality, then, is more than a pragmatic necessity of
presidential elections-though that it surely is. Finality is an
expectation of the electorate; a rule of the game. A race is run
and must be won. "It ain't over 'til it's over," as the saying goes;
but once it's over we are supposed to know who the winner is.
Like a game, an election is an activity in which, to paraphrase
Leff, you are supposed to know with some precision and
immediacy how your guy did and how things came out.
There is another legal argument that implicitly trades
on the expectations engendered by the game metaphor. It is
the claim, variously made, that only a properly marked ballot
is a "legal vote" and, therefore, that overvotes and dimpled
chads should not properly have been counted. The Florida
statutes contain no definition of a legal vote. Rather, the
Florida Supreme Court defined a legal vote in terms of the
statutory provision which says that no vote is to be declared
invalid if there is "a clear indication on the ballot that the voter
has made a definitive choice as determined by the canvassing
board.' The per curiam decision declined to revisit this
decision, finding instead that the recount did "not satisfy the
66 id.
67 HUIZINGA, supra note 29, at 13; see also CAILLOIS, supra note 30, at 9
(explaining that games are "circumscribed within limits of space and time, defined and
fixed in advance").
68 Leff, supra note 35, at 1000.
69 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.5614(5) (West Supp. 2001).
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minimum requirement for non-arbitrary treatment of
voters .... ""
The concurring Justices, however, argued that the
Florida Supreme Court's definition of a legal vote "departed
from the legislative scheme" in violation of Article 11.71 Voters,
they argued, are instructed to take care to punch the ballot
"clearly and cleanly" and to make sure that "there are no chips
left hanging on the back of the card."72 (Having voted in Florida
for many years, I can confidently say that that is good advice-
though I cannot recall ever seeing such instructions at my local
polling place in Coral Gables.) For the concurring Justices,
there was no legal reason for a recount because there had been
no rejection of legal votes. The machines merely did what they
were supposed to do, counting only such ballots as were
"marked in the manner that these voting instructions explicitly
and prominently specify."73
Judge Posner makes a more sophisticated variant of
this argument when he contends that:
A voting error is not a natural kind, like a star or a penguin or a
blade of grass, which are things that exists independently of human
cognition. A voting error is a legal category. The belief that it is
possible without reference to law to determine who won the popular
vote in Florida is the most stubborn fallacy embraced by the critics
of the U.S. Supreme Court's intervention to resolve the deadlock.
74
He then argues that a proper understanding and application of
the law suggests that Bush probably won a majority of the
popular vote in Florida.75 He concludes that the Florida
Supreme Court not only "flouted," but "butchered the state's
70 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 105 ("For purposes of resolving the equal pro-
tection challenge, it is not necessary to decide whether the Florida Supreme Court had
the authority under the legislative scheme ... to define what a legal vote is and to
mandate a manual recount. .. ").
71 id. at 118-19 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 119.
7 Id.
74POSNER, supra note 15, at 73-74.
75 See, e.g., id. at 15-16 ("The Democrats' belief that Gore would probably have
won the popular vote in Florida had more counties used a more user-friendly voting
technology is not groundless, but it does not follow that he was the "real"--that is, the
legal-winner.").
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election statute" in (among other things) ordering the recount
and allowing the counting of improperly marked ballots. 6
Both these arguments are well within the range of
respectable legal argumentation-normal science, as it were.
The concurring opinion's argument that only a properly
marked ballot is a "legal vote" is a straightforward legal
formalism. A valid will needs two witnesses; a check must be
signed; a chad must be completely punched out. Posner's
argument is closely related, but takes a philosophically and
jurisprudentially more sophisticated form. Since the 1920s, it
has been a staple of argument by legal academics on the left
that things we take as "givens" are not natural kinds but the
social construction of particular legal rules. The argument was
initiated by the legal realists 7 and more recently taken up and
extended by feminist and critical legal scholars. 8 Posner
adapts this point to conservative rhetorical ends, though that
hardly detracts from its cogency or validity.
Still, the argument is too clever by half. The problem is
that the social construction gambit which Posner invokes is the
engine of a critique that deconstructs all formalisms-including
such formalisms as "property," "freedom of contract," "gender
roles," and "legal vote." Thus, the legal realist critique was that
there could be no coherent notion of freedom of contract when
the previous distribution of legal entitlements always already
affected the relative bargaining positions of the parties. So, too,
feminist critical scholars have argued that one cannot defend
traditional gender roles on the ground that people choose them
76 Id. at 159.
The Florida statute is vague .... All the statute says on this score is
that if the court finds that enough "legal votes" were rejected to
"change or place in doubt the result of the election," it can "provide
any relief appropriate under such circumstances." "Appropriate" is not
defined.... But even a term as vague as "appropriate" does not give a
court carte blanche.
Id. at 138.
77 See Robert Hale, Law Making by Unofficial Minorities, 20 COLUM. L. REV.
451, 452-53 (1920); Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8
(1927).
71 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1748 (1976); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and
the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1497, 1508-13
(1983). See generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (fin de siclej
246-63 (1997).
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when "the state is responsible for the background rules that
affect people's domestic" choices. 9 Posner's argument is too
clever by half because he is invoking the social construction
point to justify what is, at base, the same formalism indulged
in by the concurring Justices.
One can readily concede both that a vote is not a
natural kind like a star or a penguin and that one cannot
determine who won the popular vote in Florida without
reference to law. But that still does not tell us whether we
should read that law formalistically or realistically to
accomplish its underlying purpose. The Florida Supreme Court
plainly did the latter. In holding that a "legal vote" is any
ballot that provides "a clear indication of the intent of the
voter," the Florida court merely sought "to reach the result
that reflects the will of the voters, whatever that might be."8 '
Posner charges that "[w]hen the Florida supreme court drew
upon the 'people power' clause of the state constitution to
construe the state's election code, it was imposing its own
populist values.. . ." But that's hyperbole. The Florida court
was just applying the fundamental democratic value that
government should be by the actual will of the people as best
we can determine it, rather than by the will of only those
people who-like me-are meticulous about punching out their
chads.
The heart of Posner's statutory reading is that the
"intent of the voter" provision neither applies nor modifies the
provision that provides for a recount only when there has been
an "error in the tabulation of the vote.' In this, too, he echoes
the position of the concurring Justices. 4 But the argument is
either circular or just another formalism because it too
79Frances Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 835, 837 (1985).
Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1229 (Fla.
2000).
" Id. at 1228.
POSNER, supra note 15, at 123.
Id. at 95-99.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 119 ("No reasonable person would call it 'an error
in the vote tabulation,' FLA. STAT. § 102.166(5) (West 2000), or a 'rejection of... legal
votes,' FLA. STAT. § 102.168(3)(c) (West 2000), when electronic or electromechanical
equipment performs precisely in the manner designed, and fails to count those ballots
that are not marked in the manner that these voting instructions explicitly and
prominently specify.").
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presupposes that one knows what a vote is. Since a vote is not
a natural kind like a star or a penguin, we cannot determine
whether there is an error in the tabulation of the vote unless
and until we define the term "vote." Once again, one can define
a vote either formalistically or realistically in light of its
underlying democratic purpose.
But Posner is no formalist, as even a cursory reading of
his Problems of Jurisprudence reveals. 5  Posner is a
pragmatist, which means amongst other things that he
endorses judicial reasoning that is purposive and
consequentialist. So we are left with the questions broached
earlier: How did Posner and the concurring Justices come to
make the characterizations they did and why should they and
others find those arguments plausible?
Here, too, the answer is that the arguments trade on
the expectations engendered by the game metaphor. Games are
defined by the formal order of their rules-which are
essentially arbitrary and, for that very reason, utterly
authoritative. You can't ask why the Queen in chess can move
in any direction; there's no reason for it, that's just the rule. In
just the same way, when the Florida court asks why it is that
we count votes and, then, takes that into account in deciding
what constitutes a legal vote, Posner treats the question as out
of bounds; it seems obvious to him that the decision is a case of
the court imposing its own populist values. But it isn't; it's just
standard-order, purposive legal reasoning. It occurs every day
in law, and is ordinarily celebrated by a pragmatist like
Posner. Thus, Posner has previously written that:
The contestability of legal rules stand in contrast to that of... the
rules of the game.... Although the rules of the game are changed
from time to time, it is unthinkable (in a "serious" game) to change
the rule during the game .... But legal rules do not so completely
define the activities which they enable or facilitate that those
activities lose their purpose if the rules are changed while the
85 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 40-41 (1990):
[T]oday when used pejoratively, "formalism" is more likely to refer to
an exaggerated belief in the transparency of statutory or
constitutional language and hence in the possibility of definitively
correct answers to difficult interpretive questions .... [It] spares the
lawyer or judge from a messy encounter with empirical reality.
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activities are in progress. A chess player who announces in the
middle of the game that he will not allow his rook to be captured by
his opponent's queen, because queens have too much power in chess,
might just as well sweep all the pieces from the board; and it would
not make the slightest difference whether.., the player waited until
he lost the game and then asked the umpire to order it replayed
under rules reflecting a more equitable distribution of power among
the pieces. These sorts of appeals are allowed in law, however.8
In law, the refrain "you can't change the rules in the middle of
the game" is always vulnerable to a normative challenge based
on a higher order principle implicit in the law itself. Posner's
criticism loses track of the important truth that an election is
not a game. It is a legal process that we engage in for very
important, very solemn, very democratic reasons.
III. AND ALL THE MEN AND WOMEN MERELY PLAYERS
Why, then, is our core concept of elections constituted
by our experience and understanding of games? And why, in
the final analysis, should our metaphorical understanding of
elections trump more fundamental values of democracy and
self-rule?
On Huizinga's theory, the answer is straightforward.
Huizinga sees civilization as evolving through and elaborated
by play. "It does not come from play like a babe detaching itself
from the womb: it arises in and as play and never leaves it." 7
The game quality of American elections is, for Huizinga,
merely a commonplace."
Long before the two-party system had reduced itself to two gigantic
teams whose political differences were hardly discernable to an
outsider, electioneering in America had developed into a kind of
national sport. The presidential election of 1840 set the pace for all
subsequent elections. The party calling itself Whig had an excellent
candidate, General Harrison of 1812 fame, but no platform. Fortune
gave them something infinitely better, a symbol on which they rode
to triumph: the log cabin which was the old warrior's modest abode
during his retirement.
89
Id. at 49-50. Cf POSNER, supra note 15, at 225 (quoted supra note 15).87 HUIZINGA, supra note 29, at 173.
sId. at 207 ("We need hardly add that this play-factor is present in the whole
apparatus of elections.").
8Id.
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Though Huizinga's account has its attractions," it is
problematic in at least two ways. First, Huizinga's concept of
play is, as Caillois first noted,91 much too narrow in its focus on
games with agonistic structure. There are other, familiar forms
of play-ring-around-the-rosie, the child's game of "putting on
a show," games of chance-common in our own culture.
Huizinga's account concentrates our attention on the obvious
agonistic elements of American elections. But, there are other
dimensions of play that, upon analysis, turn out to be equally
important in understanding the phenomenon of American
elections. Second, it would seem difficult to root the game-
concept of elections in a foundational spirit of play when
Huizinga himself argues that "the play-element in culture has
been on the wane ever since the 1 8th century .... Civilization
to-day is no longer played, and even when it still seems to play
it is false play."92 Huizinga is particularly harsh on modern
sports which, on his view, have been transformed by
systematization, regimentation, and professionalization.
"Between them they push sport further and further from the
play-sphere proper until it becomes a thing sui generis. . . ." "
The same might well be said of presidential campaigns, where
the sports analogy is particularly powerful.94
We can begin to address these shortcomings by
considering the richer conceptual vocabulary offered by
Caillois's typology of play. Caillois identifies four categories of
play that he designates as ag6n (i.e., conflict based), alea (i.e.,
governed by chance), mimicry (i.e., forms of make believe), and
ilinix (i.e., vertiginous or "limnal" forms of play such as
whirling, roller coaster rides, or Dionysian revelries such as
90 If nothing else, it suggests something of the cognitive and historical depth of
the game-concept of elections.
9CAILLOIS, supra note 30, at 3-5.
' Id. at 206.
93 Id. at 196-98.
94 See, e.g., Apple, supra note 12, at A23 ("[Winning, as Vince Lombardi said
in another context, is not the main thing but the only thing."); Eric Schmitt & Irvin
Molotsky, Congress: Joy and Bitterness, Along Party Lines, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2000,
at A25 ("Senator Byron L. Dorgan, Democrat of North Dakota, agreed, saying, 'If the
Supreme Court rules against Mr. Gore, I think it's been game, set, match.'"); Purdum,
supra note 17 (quoted text accompanying note 17, supra).
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Mardi Gras and Carnival).95 Each of these forms of play is
defined not by a structure, but an attitude:
the desire to win by one's merit in regulated competition (agon), the
submission of one's will in favor of anxious and passive anticipation
of where the wheel will stop (alea), the desire to assume a strange
personality (mimicry), and, finally, the pursuit of vertigo (ilinix). In
ag6n, the player relies only on himself and his utmost efforts; in
alea, he counts on everything except himself, submitting to the
powers that elude him; in mimicry, he imagines that he is someone
else, and he invents an imaginary universe; in ilinix, he gratifies the
desire to temporarily destroy his bodily equilibrium, escape the
tyranny of his ordinary perception, and provoke the abdication of
conscience. 6
Because each form of play manifests a different attitude, it also
represents a different character in the sense that it involves
particular beliefs, feelings, values, and behavioral dispositions.
Thus, for Caillois, "the destinies of cultures can be read in their
games. The preference for ag6n, alea, mimicry, or ilinix helps
decide the future of civilization."97
In his well-known Law and, Arthur Leff applied
Caillois's sociological theory to explain the structure of the
American judicial trial." Leff argued that neither the
adversary structure nor the winner-take-all format of the trial
seem particularly well suited to a procedure designed to elicit
truth and achieve justice. 9 But, he concluded, they make
perfect sense as a product of larger cultural themes in which
agonistic games dominate daily life. Americans, Leff observed,
are virtually obsessed with games: "they take part, either as
participants or spectators, in a vast array of activities they call
'sports' and 'games.' They have 'baseball,' 'football,' "basketball,'
'tennis,' and 'golf.' They have 'chess,' 'checkers,' 'bridge,' and
'Monopoly.' And these lists hardly begin to exhaust the scope of
the activity."' The trial, he concluded, is "an amphibian
cultural artifact that embodies, simultaneously, at least two
CAILLOIS, supra note 30, at 44.
96 Id.
" Id. at 35.
93 Leff, supra note 35, at 998-1005.
99 Id. at 1004 ("It is, after all, inherently implausible that an epistemological
inquiry in the form of an agonistic game maximizes thoroughness and accuracy of
factual determination.").
" Id. at 998.
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different social mechanisms."'' It is both a more-or-less
effective solution to the practical problem of determining "what
happened" and, at the same time, the enactment of a deeply
held cultural aesthetic.
0 2
The American obsession with games has, if anything,
increased since Leff wrote. Professional sports seasons have
been so far extended that we often seem to have football,
baseball, basketball, and hockey all at the same time. Video
and computer games can be found in most every home-and in
multiple technological formats that include television consoles,
personal computers, and handhelds. While gambling in various
forms has always been with us, it is no longer the special
provence of Las Vegas or the neighborhood numbers racket.
Fabulous gambling casinos have now sprung up in Atlantic
City and on numerous Indian reservations. We have also seen
the explosion of state-run lotteries-often sold as a means of
financing local education. These government-run lotteries are
heavily promoted in television, radio, and billboard advertise-
ments that multiply as the jackpots build. Drawings are
covered live on the local news.
The saturation of American life by games and game
playing is hardly a surprise. After all, by mid-century, baseball
was firmly entrenched as the "national pastime"; it was a
standard trope of World War II era movies that one could
always identify a German infiltrator by asking "Who won the
World Series?" In the post-war era, the simultaneous increase
in leisure time (the forty-hour work week now a standard of
American working life) and the advent of television (with its
voracious appetite for programming) have fueled the further
penetration of games-particularly professional sports, but
also game shows of many varieties-in American culture. More
surprising is the explosion of lotteries and gambling over the
last twenty-five years. A scant century ago, the idea that
lotteries were a "widespread pestilence" justifying nearly
universal state prohibition as well as congressional action
barring the movement of lottery tickets in interstate commerce
101 Id. at 1005.
102 See id. at 1003 ("[]t is the nature of the game solution that it be, so to
speak, an aesthetic solution to a practical problem: one does something and can be seen
to do something that 'fits' the rule that gives it significance.").
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was simply a truism of constitutional law."'3 Today, one can
scarcely find a state that does not run a lottery.
There is another way in which the explosion of
gambling seems-superficially, at least-to be at odds with
American culture. The heart of the Huizinga-Caillois argument
is that the dominance of agonistic forms of play in Western
culture conduces to competitive, meritocratic forms of social
ordering in the economic, social, and political institutions of
everyday life. Conversely, Caillois argues that societies which
manifest a marked preference for alea, mimicry, or ilinix tend
toward very different forms of social ordering."° From this
perspective, the rise of institutionalized gambling appears at
first blush as an aberration in our market-based, highly
competitive, careerist, work-oriented culture.
I do not want to make too much of this purported
anomaly, for there are many ways in which the inconsistency is
only apparent. For one thing, the "get rich quick" impulse
behind the popularity of state-run lotteries is perfectly
consonant with the materialist values and "rags to riches" folk
model (conventionally identified with the Horatio Alger story10 5)
that characterize American culture. For another, there are
innumerable games from backgammon to Monopoly that
combine ag6n and alea. Indeed, the combination of competition
and chance is integral to the meaning and psychological
resonance of the play
10 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 357 (1903).104 See CAILLOIS, supra note 30, at 83-86:
[Ilf games are cultural factors and images, it follows that to a
certain degree a civilization and its content may be characterized by
its games. They necessarily reflect its culture patterns and provide
useful indications as to the preferences, weakness, and strength of the
given society at a particular stage of its evolution....
I do not mean to insinuate in any way that cultures are like games
and therefore also governed by ag6n, alea, mimicry, and ilinix ...
However I also suspect that the principles of play, persistent and
widespread mainsprings of human activity . . . must markedly
influence different types of society.
Id.
105 In popular culture, Horatio Alger is often mistaken for the hero of these
stories; in fact, Alger was the author of over forty novels and short stories with this
theme. See Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Ag~n Between Legal
Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2225, 2268 (1989).
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in which the player's pleasure derives from having done as well as
possible in a situation not of his creation, the course of which he
alone can only partly control. Chance is represented in the
resistance offered by nature, the external world, or the will of the
gods to his strength, skill, or knowledge. The game seems like the
very image of life, yet an imaginary, ideal, ordered, separate, and
limited image.
106
In this way, success in the game provides the psychological
.satisfaction of obstacles overcome and mimics for the player
the satisfaction from mastery that may elude him or her in real
life.
From a psychological point of view, in other words, play
serves a compensatory function. The psychological centrality of
games derives from their capacity to create order in a chaotic,
unpredictable, imperfect world. The precise, often arbitrary
rules of a game are comforting because they define time and
space, the permissible and impermissible, winners and losers.
Games provide structure, aesthetic order, and closure. Play, in
other words, provides respite from the conditions and
uncertainties of ordinary life.
But, for play to work as escape from life's pressures, it
must take a particular, psychologically resonant form: It must
mimic the life-world, and it must do so in a way that is both
psychologically "safe" and, at the same time, allows that world
to be mastered or overcome. In agonistic games, the players
rely on their merit in regulated competition governed by
conditions of formal equality. Here, unlike life, it is only who
you are and not who you know that determines success. In
games of chance, the players submit to powers that elude
them-subsuming their will-to-power in anxious and passive
anticipation of where the wheel will stop. In games of mimicry
(i.e., play acting), the players imagine themselves as someone
they are not (but long to be), inventing and inhabiting an
imaginary proxy universe.
The need for this psychological compensation is
intensified under the highly competitive conditions of late-
capitalist societies such as the United States."7 Modern society
10 CAILLOIS, supra note 30, at 75. See also id. at 121 ("There is doubtless no
combination more inextricable than that of ag6n and alea.").
'07By "late capitalism," I refer to the social conditions and practices
characteristic of postmodernity in so-called "post-industrial" economies such as ours.
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presents itself as rewarding merit expressed under conditions
of competitive equality. Nearly every aspect of the social and
economic world is organized by competition in markets that are
presumptively open, fair, and governed only by merit."8 But,
there is inevitable discordance between expectation and
reality. Everyone wants to be first; but, by definition, everyone
cannot be. "Daily competition is harsh and implacable as well
as monotonous and exhausting. It provides no diversion and
accumulates rancor. It abuses and discourages ... ."0, Thus,
the injunction to "pull yourself up by your bootstraps" implies
to those who fall behind that they have only themselves to
blame. At the same time, the sheer complexity of late-capitalist
societies requires enormous endowments of social capital-the
right schools, the technical know-how-just to have a fair
chance to compete. Eligibility (i.e., formal equality) simply does
not suffice for meaningful participation in the rigors of real-
world social and economic contest."0 "Wealth, education,
training, family background are all external and often decisive
conditions which in practice may negate legal equality.""' To
those without such advantages, it will often seem that success
is governed more by chance than by merit. And, in any event,
"Chance, like merit, selects only a favored few.""
In this context, play assumes the starkly political
functions of legitimation and pacification. For those with the
physical skill to compete successfully, agonistic games like
sports provide an opportunity to triumph that might otherwise
be absent from their day-to-day experiences in the economic
These practices and processes include techno-bureaucratic rationalization,
commodification, consumerism, media saturation, and social fragmentation. See, e.g.,
Steven L. Winter, For What It's Worth, 26 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 789, 793-99, 811-12
(1992).
'0 See CAILLOIS, supra note 30, at 114 ("modern society tends to enlarge the
domain of regulated competition, or merit, as the expense of birth and inheritance, or
chance, an evolution which is reasonable, just, and favorable to the most capable.").
'9 Id. at 119.
... See id. at 112:
The equality of citizens is proclaimed, . . . [but i]nheritance continues
to weigh upon everybody like a mortgage that cannot be paid off-the
laws of chance that reflect the continuity of nature and the inertia of
society. . . . Laws and constitutions seek to establish a fair
balance .... However, it is obvious that the competitors are not equal
in opportunity to make a good start.
Id. at 112.
... Id. at 120.
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and social sphere. Even when the player is not successful, the
game nevertheless provides the comfort and reassurance of
regulated competition under conditions of absolute formal
equality-i.e., that the rules are fair and the playing field
even." 3 Thus fortified, the player can return to the larger arena
of real-world contest with the sense (or illusion) that things are
as they should be-i.e., that competition is fair and success still
possible.
For those who cannot effectively compete, gambling and
other games of chance provide "a necessary compensation for
ag6n.... Recourse to chance helps people tolerate competition
that is unfair or too rugged.""" As in agonistic games, gambling
and other games of chance provide formal equality; in alea,
Caillois observes, formal equality is all the more rigorous for
its mathematical precision."' Games of chance are more
radically leveling-and, hence, yet more effective in their legiti-
mating function: "[E]ven the least endowed... may be equal to
the most resourceful and perspicacious as a result of the
miraculous blindness of a new kind of justice.""'
Much the same process is at work in the cult of celebrity
characteristic of contemporary mass culture. Caillois refers to
it as a form of "alienation," arguing that this form of
"identification constitutes one of the essential compensatory
mechanisms of democratic society."" 7 By identification with the
sports hero or movie star, ordinary citizens can share
vicariously in the triumphs, adulation, and lavish lifestyle they
could never achieve themselves. (Hence, the appeal of such
shows as Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous.) It is a crucial part
of this compensatory process, however, that the fans be able to
see themselves in these proxies. This is what accounts for two
113 This will be true, moreover, whether the game is one of pure skill or one
that combines competition and chance. See Callois, supra note 30, at 74-75 ("In play
and games, ag6n and alea are regulated.").
1 Id. at 115; see also id. at 114:
[Miany people do not count on receiving much from personal merit
alone. They are well aware that others are abler, more skillful,
stronger, more intelligent, more hardworking, more ambitious,
healthier, have a better memory, and are more pleasing or persuasive
than they are. . . . They therefore turn to chance, seeking a
discriminatory lrinciple that might be kinder to them.
... Id. at 74.
.. Id. at 114.
17 Caillois, supra note 30, at 122.
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of the singular aspects of celebrity culture: (1) the mythos of
the rise from obscurity-the starlet discovered at the drugstore
counter, the body-builder turned movie star (and Kennedy in-
law), the boy from Tupelo, Mississippi becomes the King of
Rock and Roll or the one from Hope becomes President; 8 and
(2) the voracious appetite for gossip about celebrities-their
affairs, divorces, weight problems, personal tragedies, and
other melodramas-that fuels the enormous industry of tabloid
journalism. On one hand, as Caillois remarks, the meteoric rise
from obscurity of "the champion and the star illustrate the
dazzling successes possible even to the most underprivileged...
."19 On the other hand, there is an underlying envy and resent-
ment that revels in the foibles and failings of the rich and
famous-the concomitant need to pull one's idols down off the
pedestal and prove that they are, after all, really no better
than the rest of us.no
Under conditions of late-capitalism, ag6n tends to
merge with mimicry as play is rationalized, professionalized,
and commodified. "While Americans are spending less time
doing sports," Putnam observes, "we are spending more time
and money watching sports . .. ." Watching professional
sports-especially on television-has increasingly supplanted
actual play.m Just as the cult of celebrity allows even the
lowliest to "succeed" through identification with sports heroes
and movie stars, a culture of spectator sports enables fans to
"win" vicariously via the professional teams they root for. So,
too, with other forms of play: More and more, people observe it
rather than participate themselves. For example, while
attendance at museums and concerts is up, the proportion "of
,1 This folk model is probably as old as culture: It can be found in fairytales
such as Cinderella and, in a variety of forms, in both the Old and New Testaments.
119 CALLOIS, supra note 30, at 124.
120 See id. at 123 ("One also imagines such a career to be somewhat suspicious,
impure, or irregular. The residue of envy underlying admiration does not fall to see in
it a triumph compounded of ambition, intrigue, impudence, and publicity.").
ROBERT D. PUTNAti, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REViVAL OF
AMERicAN PuBUc LIFE 109-13 (2000).
122 "[Als a fraction of the population, participation in all of the following sports
has fallen by 10-20 percent over the last decade or two: softball, tennis (and other
racket games, like table tennis), volleyball, football, bicycling, skiing (downhill, cross-
country, and water), hunting, fishing, camping, canoeing, jogging, and swimming." Id.
at 109. The same is true for youth sports, with the exception that there has been an
increase in organized school sports for young women. Id. at 110.
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households in which even one person plays an instrument has
fallen from 51 percent in 1978 to 38 percent in 1997."M Play
still provides psychological escape, but it is progressively
passivized-even alienated.
The increasing passivity of play is mirrored in the
political sphere. In the last quarter of the twentieth century,
fewer Americans signed a petition, wrote to their elected
representatives, attended a town or school board meeting,
belonged to a political club, worked for a party, ran for political
office, participated in a public rally, or went to hear a political
speech than in decades past.124 For most Americans,
participation in self-governance subsists in the occasional,
formalistic act of voting on election day. And, of course, even
that is declining:
Throughout most of the twentieth century, voting rates in the
United States were much lower than in almost all other advanced
democracies. From 1960 to 1995, the average election turnout in
thirty-seven other countries almost invariably exceeded 70 or 80
percent of the eligible citizens, with only a modest decline in recent
years. During the same period, turnout in American presidential
elections was 20-40 percent lower than the average for most of these
nations, and declined much more sharply. From the early 1960s to
1996, voting in presidential elections fell by 25 percent, from well
over 60 percent to slightly less than 50 percent. In off-year elections
for Congress and for governorships, turnouts dropped from 48
percent in the mid-1960s to 36 percent in 1998. Over the same
period, voting rates in midterm primary elections plummeted from
approximately 30 percent to barely more than 17 percent. These
trends are all the more remarkable since they occurred in a period
when registration barriers were falling and education levels were
increasing throughout the population.12zi
Even more striking than these bare statistics is the fact that
declining voter participation has coincided with the
professionalization of politics. In the last third of the twentieth
century, American political parties experienced phenomenal
growth in financing, organization, size of professional staff,
"AId. at 114-15.
'
24 Id. at 40-41.
DEREK C. BoK, THE TROUBLE WITH GOVERNMENT 387 (2001).
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sophistication of their polling and advertising even as party
loyalty and citizen participation steadily declined.2 6
But, if politics and play seem largely parallel in their
increasing passivity, they remain sharply different in their
degree of penetration in daily life. In sharp contrast to the
pervasiveness of games in American culture, the experience of
self-governance is abstract, theoretical and alien. Frank
Michelman explains that in republican theory: "Freedom in its
fullest sense is self-government, active engagement in a self-
directive process that is cognitive as well as volitional."27 But,
in that sense, most of us are not free. Most of us live and work
in social institutions that are hierarchical and bureaucratic.
Very, very few of us live in municipalities governed by town
meetings, attend democratically organized houses of worship,
or labor in self-governing workplaces. Nor are' our families
democratically organized. From dawn to dusk, except perhaps
on election day, democracy and self-governance are strangers-
no real part of our day-to-day experience. Indeed, as we have
seen, Americans increasingly lack self-governance even in their
play. It should hardly seem surprising that, as Frank
Michelman observes, "active self-government" is something
"that citizens find practically beyond reach."'
We can now see why our core concept of elections is
constituted by our experience of games rather than our
understanding of democracy. First, for us as Americans, the
practice of game-playing is concrete, immediate, and familiar.
But, if we have a robust, well-developed understanding of
games, we are not equally well versed in the practices of self-
government. Simply put, we do not truly understand
democracy and self-rule because we have little or no experience
of it. To paraphrase something I said in the book, a better
election law can always be promulgated, but self-governance
126 PUTNAM1, supra note 121, at 37-40.
127 Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of
Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 73 (1986).
1 Id. at 74; see also id. at 75 ("For a citizen of Geneva it was perhaps
imaginable that positive freedom could be realized for everyone through direct-
democratic self-government, a sovereignIess civic process of ruling and being ruled,
with no place for legal authority beyond the process itself. But for citizens of the
United States, national politics are not imaginably the arena of self-government in its
positive, freedom-giving sense.").
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must be lived if it is to continue to be recognized as such."O No
wonder the rhetoric of games and game-playing seemed more
resonant than arguments premised on substantive democratic
values: The latter had nothing to resonate with.
Second, one can hardly expect fundamental values of
democracy and self-rule to trump the expectations of the game
metaphor when, in both social spheres, we have internalized a
passive ethic of spectatorship and consumerism. For most
Americans, politics is a game that--like most games-is played
by others.
Barely two decades ago election campaigns were for millions of
Americans an occasion for active participation in national
deliberation. Campaigning was something we did, not something we
merely witnessed. Now for almost all Americans, an election
campaign is something that happens around us, a grating element in
the background noise of everyday life, a fleeting image on a TV
screen. Strikingly, the dropout rate from these campaign activities
(about 50 percent) is even greater than the dropout rate in the
voting booth (25 percent).
130
Here, as elsewhere in contemporary culture, voters are reduced
to mere consumers. "Participation in politics is increasingly
based on the checkbook, as money replaces time."13 ' As
consumers, satisfaction is achieved not in civic participation,
but indirectly through identification with one's candidates or
as spectators of staged campaign events and content-free
televised debates. And, just as the cult of celebrity comprises a
resentment that relishes the failings of the famous, the
practice of our postmodern, non-participatory democracy
entails a corrosive cynicism about a political game in which the
average citizen cannot compete (and, therefore, can never win).
Little wonder that Americans are apathetic about politics,
cynical about politicians' motivations, and suspicious of their
government.
The judicial resolution of the 2000 presidential contest
and the muted public reaction to the Court's usurpation in
Bush v. Gore pose a seemingly overwhelming challenge. For
those who care about democracy, the picture seems bleak
129 See WINTER, supra note 27, at 352.
13O PUTNAM, supra note 121, at 41.
"
1 1 Id. at 40.
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indeed. One thing, however, seems clear: If we are ever to
reclaim the values of democracy and self-governance, it will be
only because we have begun to practice and live those values in
our communities, our workplaces, and our everyday lives.
Now, perhaps, is the time to begin.

